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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 










BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as amended, with an accusation seeking 
to have respondent removed from public off ice. The 
accusation was filed by a Weber County Grand Jury on or 
about December 27, 1979. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 21, 1980, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
sitting as a District Court Judge in Ogden, Utah, dismissed 
the accusation of the Weber County Grand Jury based on a 
written objection filed by respondent. This is an appeal 
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brought by the State of Utah based on the order of 
dismissal entered by the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the ruling of 
the District Court reversed and the matter remanded 
for trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent, Robert Bowen, was elected as a 
County Commissioner in Weber County in November of 1978 
and took office on or about January 1, 1979. On August 
7, 1979, respondent was con,victed in the Third Circuit 
Court of Weber County by the Honorable Larry R. Keller of 
32 counts of obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepre-
sentation and fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-19 
(1953), as amended. Each count was a class B misdemeanor. 
The offenses for which respondent was convicted occurred 
prior to his election to office, although the trial 
occurred after the election, and the underlying facts were 
only discovered after his election to office. 
On or about December 27, 1979, a Weber County 
Grand Jury filed an accusation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-1 and § 77-7-2 (1953) , as amended, for the purpose 
of removing Robert Bowen from off ice as a County Commissioner. 
The accusation alleged that the conviction involved an issue 
-2-
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of "moral turpitude" and thus the respondent should be 
removed from office. 
The respondent, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 
77-7-7 (1953), as amended, filed a written objection to 
the accusation. The trial court granted respondent's 
motion to dismiss the accusation. The State of Utah now 
appeals that ruling. 
The issue on appeal is whether a public official 
may be removed from off ice because he has been convicted 
of crimes involving moral turpitude while holding office, 
although the offenses occurred prior to taking office. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS CONVICTED OF 
CRIMES INVOLVING DISHONESTY AND MORAL 
TURPITUDE MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE 
PURSUANT TO § 77-7-1 UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1953), AS AMENDED, EVEN IF THE CRIMES 
WERE COMMITTED PRIOR TO TAKING OFFICE. 
The removal of a public official from office in 
Utah is governed by statutory authority. The statute under 
which this proceeding was initiated is Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-1 (1953), as amended, and reads as follows: 
All officers of any city, county 
or other political subdivision of this 
state not liable to impeachment shall 
be subject to removal as provided in 
this chapter upon being convicted of 
a felony, an indictable misdemeanor, ~ 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude 
or malfeasance in office. {Emphasis added.) 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
"meaning and proper application of the statute is 
determined by considering its language in light of 
background and purpose." State v. Jones, 17 U.2d 
190, 407 P.2d 571, at 572 (Utah 1965); Andrus v. 
Allred, 17 Utah 106, 404 P.2d 972 (Utah 1965). This 
Court held in State v. Jones, supra, that the objective 
or purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 and § 77-7-2 
(1953), as amended, is to provide: 
. . . a method of removing from office 
a public official, even though duly 
elected, who betrays his trust in office, 
i.e., is guilty of malfeasance or who 
commits a crime of such nature as ~ 
demonstrate that he is unfit to hold 
public officeG Id. at 572 (emphasis 
added). ~ 
The object of removal from public office of a public 
official convicted of a crime is not to punish the 
incumbent, but to protect and preserve the office, and 
to free the public of an unfit officer. 
Several other jurisdictions have held that the 
primary purpose of the removal statute is to remove public 
officials from office who are unfit to hold that office. 
See State ex rel. Longerholm v. Schroeder, 199 Kan. 403, 
430 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1967); People ex rel. Taberski v. _ 
Illinois Appellate Court, First District, 278 N.E.2d 796 
-4-
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(Ill. 1972); State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wash.2d 
419, 367 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1962). 
The law in Utah is clear that conviction of a 
misdemeanor would not warrant removal from office, unless 
the conviction involved matters of "moral turpitude" or 
"malfeasance" in office. For a misdemeanor to work a 
forfeiture of office the offense must involve lack of 
honesty or integrity, that is, unfitness to hold office. 
Respondent's conviction definitely involved 
"moral turpitude" and therefore the removal statute was 
applicable. 
The trial court ruled in this case that 
respondent was convicted of 32 misdemeanors involving 
moral turpitude during his term of office (T.3 and 
Memorandum Decision). The trial court said the offense 
of obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation 
was a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 
In State v. Jones, supra~ the Utah Supreme 
Court was confronted with the same question of whether 
a misdemeanor conviction involved the issue of moral 
turpitude. In that case, David P. Jones, a Salt Lake 
County Auditor, was convicted on April 7, 1965, of 
a misdemeanor offense for failing to file an income 
tax return on April 15, 1959. Shortly after the defendant's 
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conviction, the Salt Lake County Attorney commenced an 
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as 
amended, to remove the defendant from office. The action 
was initiated based upon the defendant's misdemeanor 
conviction. The Supreme Court of Utah was confronted 
with two issues: (1) did the misdemeanor offense for 
failing to file an income tax return involve an issue of 
moral turpitude; and (2) can a public official elected to 
off ice be removed because of his conviction for a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, even though the 
offense occurred before his election to office. 
In addressing the question of whether the 
conviction involved an issue of moral turpitude, the Utah 
Supreme Court said in order to forfeit office, the 
offense must be within a class of crimes which guilt would 
demonstrate a lack of honesty, integrity or moral character 
so as to render one unfit for public office. The Supreme 
Court said the offense of failing to file an income tax 
return was not necessarily one involving moral turpitude. 
The record was not clear why Mr. Jones failed to file his 
tax return. The court said there were several possible 
reasons why the return was not filed, including lack of 
funds, a personal vendetta with the federal government, or 
tax evasion. The Supreme Court concluded that since the 
-6-
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the offense of failing to file a tax return did not 
necessarily involve a lack of honesty or moral turpitude, 
the defendant could not be removed from office. 
In this case, the trial court ruled that 
obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation 
demonstrated a lack of honesty, integrity or moral 
character and therefore was sufficient to constitute a 
crime involving moral turpitude. Appellant agrees with 
the trial court's ruling that respondent's conviction 
for obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation 
involves moral turpitude. 
The purpose of the Utah Removal Statute is to 
remove public officials from off ice when convicted of a 
crime involving dishonesty or lack of integrity. Certainly, 
respondent's 32 misdemeanor convictions for illegally 
obtaining public funds, unemployment benefits, qualifies 
respondent for removal from office, especially from an 
office which directs and controls, so intimately, public 
funds. Although the misdemeanor conviction occurred 
while the defendant was in office, and although the crimes 
were not discovered until after the defendant took office, 
the trial court concluded that removal was justified only 
if the offense occurred while the respondent was serving 
office. (T. 6) . 
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Appellant submits that the trial court erred 
in its interpretation of the Removal Statute.which is 
designed to remove unfit persons from office. The 
critical factor should be when the crime was discovered 
and when the conviction was obtained; not when the offense 
occurred. To allow a public official to remain in office 
after being convicted of an offense involving moral 
turpitude is to defeat the purpose of the Removal Statute. 
The issue is one of first impression for the Utah 
Supreme Court. In State v. Jones, supra, the Court was 
confronted with this same issue but ruled on other grounds. 
Even the trial court noted in its Memorandum Decision 
that State v. Jones, supra, was decided on other grounds 
(p. 2, Memorandum Decision). 
Several jurisdictions have held that misconduct 
occurring prior to election or in a prior term of office 
may constitute grounds for removing the guilty public 
officer from his present term of office. 
In Application of Baker, 386 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1976), 
the Supreme Court of New York said the statute providing 
for removal for misconduct "in office" allowed removal 
of an officer for misconduct in a prior term where all of 
the charges were not made public until after election and 
where the office holder had denied any wrongdoing. See 
-8-
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also In the Matter of Corwin, 218 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1961). 
In Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 
131 N.E. 573, 132 N.E. 322, 17 A.L.R. 274, the court 
was confronted with a situation where a number of offenses, 
including acts as a private citizen, had been charged 
against a district attorney in removal proceeding. 
The court said that the illegal acts or misconduct which 
occurred outside the district attorney's official duties 
could be considered in determining his fitness to hold 
public office. Bolton v. Tully, 158 A. 805 (Conn. 1932); 
Hawkins v. Grand Rapids, 158 N.W. 953 (Mich. 1916); 
State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden, 88 N.W. 412 (Minn. 1901). 
The reason for removing guilty public officials 
from office for crimes committed prior to election is 
based on the theory that the crime or misconduct may have 
been hidden from the electing body until after the start 
of the new term of office, thus the voters did not have 
opportunity to ensure fit public officials. In the present 
case the discovery of the offense came after the election 
and the only recourse for insuring a fit and honest official 
would be through§ 77-7-1 Utah Code Ann., et seq. 
Legally, respondent was not unfit to hold office 
until his conviction was entered for obtaining unemployment 
benefits by misrepresentation. Charging the defendant with 
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a misdemeanor offense would have been insufficient to 
warrant a removal proceeding. In State v. Stavar, 578 P.2d 
847 (1978), the Supreme Court said a conviction of one of 
the offenses enumerated in Section 77-7-1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), as amended, is a prerequisite to bringing an action 
for removal from office. The Stavar decision is consistent 
with the principle of criminal law that the defendant is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. A public official 
cannot be removed from office until a conviction is obtained. 
Since the only logical time centers on the 
time of conviction rather than the time of offense, the 
trial court decision should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for trial. The trial court's decision that the 
offense must occur while the respondent is in off ice is 
inconsistent with Stavar and the presumption of innocence. 
The conviction of respondent demonstrating his dishonesty 
and unfitness to hold office should be sufficient to warrant 
his removal from public office. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and supporting 
case law, appellant urges this Court to reverse the trial 
court ruling and remand the case to district court for 
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trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ERNIE JONES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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